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Abstract: 
 
Recently there has been a significant increase in the involvement of children and young 
people in protests across the globe. As a result of this increase, children have directly 
influenced political change but have also faced threats to their safety.  This raises distinct 
children’s rights issues, and the trends identified necessitate both conceptualizing protest 
involvement from a children’s rights perspective, and critically examining the manner in 
which the law—at both a national and international level—has approached the involvement 
of children in such activities.  This Article examines the positive obligations of States and 
argues that children should be recognized as a distinct, valid, and sometimes vulnerable 
group that has the right to protest and the right to be facilitated in doing so. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
International civil and political rights relating to ‘autonomy’ remain relatively unexamined in 
their application to children.
1
  This is particularly so for the right to freedom of assembly in 
general and for the right to engage in peaceful protest in particular.
2
   ‘Children’—defined 
here as those under the age of eighteen—are notable for their minority status even though the 
spectrum ranges from infants to young adults.
3
  Despite this status, they have long been 
involved in peaceful protest.  Strikes by school children featured prominently in the struggle 
against apartheid in South Africa.
4
  During the First Intifada in the Occupied Palestinian 
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 Rights which involve children participating in matters affecting them are often referred to as ‘participation 
rights’.  Such rights are often neglected by commentators, international human rights monitoring bodies, and 
others due to traditional notions of children as helpless and vulnerable.  I prefer the term ‘autonomy rights’ here, 
as the term ‘participation’ is open to criticism.  Quennerstedt argues that ‘participation’ is “a light-weight 
version” of the more high-status framework of civil and political rights generally used in human rights law.  Ann 
Quennerstedt, Children, but not really Humans? Critical Reflections on the Hampering Effect of the “3 p’s”, 18 
Int’l J.of Child. Rts. 619 (2010), at 630.  
2
 See e.g. the comment of Dainius Puras that examination of the right of children to freedom of association has 
been particularly neglected. Damon Barrett and Philip Veerman, Article 33: Protection from Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, in A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
xiii (André Alen et. al. eds., 2007). 
3
 Those under age eighteen will hereafter be referred to collectively as ‘children’ although admittedly not all 
individuals under age eighteen would identify with this term.  
4
 See South African History Online, Youth and the National Liberation Movement, available at 
 http://www.sahistory.org.za/20th-century-south-africa/youth-and-national-liberation-struggle-1894-1994 (last 
visited May 17, 2012). 
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Territories, children mobilized in demonstrations, contributing to the description of the 
uprising  as a “truly a popular rebellion.”5  This trend has greatly increased in recent years—
the involvement of children in a number of modern protest movements has been strikingly 
evident.  In the 2006 immigrant rights protests in the United States, young people engaged in 
huge numbers, organizing and orchestrating protests and walkouts.
6
  More recent global 
developments have put the matter of protest to the forefront of human rights and political 
discourse.  Children have been heavily involved in current protests against cuts in social 
expenditure, for example the 2010 protest against increases in university fees in England.
7
  
They have protested against social and economic inequality more generally, for example 
through the ‘Occupy’ movement.8 Perhaps most strikingly, children have been involved in 
the uprisings in the Arab world since 2011.
9
  Their activities have, at times, played a pivotal 
role in the initiation of such movements.
10
  Yet, children also have particular vulnerabilities 
which render their involvement in protest both dangerous and controversial.  Considering 
these ground-breaking developments, the global nature of these phenomena, and the unique 
position of children both legally and socially, the relevant international human rights law 
framework as it currently applies to children and protest is a key area of research. 
 
This Article addresses the international human rights framework and the involvement of 
children in peaceful protest, envisaged primarily in the form of demonstration.  Many 
children hold views about social and political issues and may wish to engage in protest.  This 
Article considers the conceptualization of children in this context and challenges the 
assumptions of predictable arguments that may be used to exclude them.  Protest appears to 
be on the increase, and children are likely to be involved now more than ever.  This Article 
also highlights that protest can be risky and that children as a group can face threats from 
authorities.  The manner in which the law has approached the involvement of children in 
protest, both at domestic and regional or international levels, is also critically considered.  
Particular analysis is provided on the comments of the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, which indicates that, although the Committee has not significantly progressed 
understanding of obligations to children (which is perhaps unsurprising, because of the nature 
of the state reporting process to the Committee), the Committee has, at the very least, 
emphasized a presumption in favor of the right of children to enjoy protest rights on an equal 
                                                          
5
 Anne Marie Baylouny, The Palestinian Intifada, in The International Encyclopedia of Peace (Nigel Young ed., 
2010), available at http://faculty.nps.edu/ambaylou/home.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
6
 Christina M. Getrich, Negotiating Boundaries of Social Belonging: Second-Generation Mexican Youth and the 
Immigrant Rights Protests of 2006, 52 Am. Behav. Sci. 533, 534 (2008). 
7
 Peter Walker et. al., Student Protests: School’s Out Across the UK as Children take to the Streets, Guar. Nov.  
24, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/nov/24/student-protests-school-children-
streets#start-of-comments (last visited May 17, 2012). 
8
  Surveys of the Occupy Wall Street protestors, for example, revealed that 26.7% were enrolled in school. See 
The Week Staff, The Demographics of Occupy Wall Street: By Numbers, Oct. 20, 2011, available at 
http://theweek.com/article/index/220529/the-demographics-of-occupy-wall-street-by-the-numbers (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2013). 
9
 Protests in Syria were sparked in 2011 by the arrest and torture of young boys for spray-painting anti-regime 
graffiti. See Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. 
G.A. Hum. Rts. Cl., 17th Sess., 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (2011) and Human Rights Watch, “We’ve 
Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces (2011), 1. 
10
 Id. 
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basis with adults.
11
  Whilst this approach is commendable, the positive obligations owed to 
children because of their special vulnerabilities have not been adequately elucidated by the 
Committee. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights appears to be the sole human rights court at regional 
level in which matters relating to children and protest have been considered. Therefore, 
analysis of this jurisprudence is provided.  The recent UK Castle judgment,
12
 which likewise 
seems to be the only recent domestic law case relating directly to the treatment of children in 
the context of mass demonstration,
13
 is examined in detail.  In Castle, the containment 
(‘kettling’) of protesting children in uncomfortable conditions for a number of hours was held 
not to have constituted a breach by the authorities of their duties.
14
  This Article argues that 
the decision is questionable from a children’s rights perspective on a number of levels.  It is 
then argued that states have positive obligations, under both the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and in accordance with international standards generally, to take 
special measures for children who wish to engage in protest.  States must facilitate their right 
to protest, but also take special measures (e.g. advance planning and training of police) in 
order to account for their potential vulnerabilities.  These obligations need to be given greater 
attention at the international level in order to be adequately applied in domestic cases such as 
Castle.  
 
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of international human rights law 
standards in the context of children and peaceful protest. Assumptions about childhood are 
challenged, and the Article questions whether the current legal approach is sufficient.  The 
Article argues for greater attention to the positive obligations of states, in order to 
acknowledge the rights that children have as well as the contribution which children can and 
do make to their societies. 
 
II. Rights, Protest, and International Human Rights Law 
 
The lack of analysis to date of the protest rights of children as a group is striking considering 
the vital nature of protest.  Although historically there has been no positive right to protest,
15
 
protection of peaceful protest is found within various human rights and freedoms, most 
notably the right to freedom of assembly.  The rights to freedom of association and to 
freedom of expression
16
 also potentially encompass protest rights.
17
  Together they are, 
                                                          
11
 Concluding Observations: Japan, adopted 26 Feb. 2004, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, 35th Sess., 
¶ 29-30, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.231 (2004). 
12
 Castle & Others v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 2317 (Admin). 
13
 It is difficult to assert this conclusively, but it appears at least to be the sole Anglophone domestic law case in 
recent times which directly involved children and protest. 
14
 Castle & Others v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 2317 (Admin). 
15
 David Mead, The Right to Peaceful Protest under the European Convention on Human Rights - A Content 
Study of Strasbourg Case Law, 4 Eur. J. Hum. R. L. 345, 347 (2007). 
16
 In Ziliberberg v. Moldova, App. No 61821/00 Eur. Ct. H. R. (4 May 2004), ¶ 2, the European Court of 
Human Rights made an explicit link between the right to freedom of assembly and the right to freedom of 
expression: “[T]he right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and, like the right 
to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society.” 
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according to Scheinin, “the core in the category of political rights.” 18   States have a 
responsibility to uphold the right to freedom of assembly under a number of different 
international instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
19
 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
20
 the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights,21 the American Convention on Human Rights,22 and the ECHR.23  The right 
to freedom of assembly includes the right of groups to engage in ‘protest’.24  The most 
familiar mode of protest is arguably demonstration-like activity.  For example, the recent 
demonstrations in the Arab world (popularly referred to as the “Arab Spring”), received 
extensive coverage and resulted in significant political change in the region.
25
  Jayawickrama 
defines a demonstration as “a form of assembly whose objective is to convey to the person or 
authority for whom a communication is intended the feelings of the group so 
demonstrating.” 26   There are, however, many other forms of resistance which could be 
classified as ‘protest’ activities, such as walk-outs, sit-ins, and boycotts.27  These types of 
peaceful protest aim to communicate in a highly visible manner and to display force while 
avoiding violence.
28
  Protest aims to bring about change through peaceful means, and 
therefore it can be vital for the health of a democracy and consequently for the upholding of 
human rights.  It can also be crucial for promoting the interests of, and achieving change for, 
particular groups of people. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17
 The right to freedom of association is usually included in the provision for freedom of assembly, however the 
drafters of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) saw fit to separate out the two 
principles for the purpose of that document.  See Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
CCPR Commentary 482-483 (2nd ed. 2005) and Martin Scheinin, Article 20, in The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: A Commentary 417-429 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1999). 
18
 Martin Scheinin, supra note 17, at 417. 
19
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, 
art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948). 
20
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., at 52, arts. 21 and 22, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 
Mar. 1976)  
21
 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), adopted 
27 June 1981, art. 10, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986).  The right 
to free association and freedom of peaceful assembly is also enshrined in Article 8 of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. 
22
 American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, art. 15 (entered into force 18 July 1978). 
23
 Article 11. 
24
 Fenwick makes the point that in the case of certain types of protest, such as physically blocking machinery, 
the ‘assembly’ element may not be important and the activity may instead be categorized as freedom of 
expression.  Helen Fenwick, Marginalising Human Rights: Breach of the Peace, “Kettling”, the Human Rights 
Act and Public Protest, 4 Pub. L. 737, 739 (2009). 
25
 See e.g. Magid Shihade et al., The Season of Revolution: The Arab Spring and European Mobilizations, 4 
Interface 16 (2012). 
26
 Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International 
Jurisprudence 725 (2002).  The terms ‘protest’ and demonstration’ are also sometimes used interchangeably. 
Gelber defines a protest as “a politically expressible, collective gathering in a public place.” Katherine Gelber, 
The Right to Protest and Australian Political Culture. Paper presented at Conference of the Australian Political 
Studies Association (28-30 Sep. 2009) available at http://ssis.arts.unsw.edu.au/staff/katharine-gelber-1109.html 
(last visited 27 July 2012). 
27
 See Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton, Civil Resistance and Power Politics, 2-4 (2009). For consideration of 
the difficulties generally in defining ‘protest’ for the purpose of legal analysis, see Mead, supra note 15, at 347. 
28
 Jayawickrama, supra note 26. 
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The importance of protest for individuals and for democracy generally has long been 
recognized,
29
 as demonstrated by the inclusion of the right to freedom of assembly and 
freedom of association in numerous international instruments.
30
  The degree of acceptance of 
the importance of protest at international level, however, belies the fact that protest creates 
public order challenges for authorities.  Protest frequently involves extremely large crowds of 
people from very different groups, some of whom may not intend to protest peacefully.  In 
some of these instances, conflict with authorities is inevitable.
31
  
 
The Arab Spring demonstrations from 2011 provided strong evidence of the change that 
protest can make for peoples’ rights and interests,32  but it also brought attention to the 
dangers which protestors can face at the hands of state authorities.
33
  In light of these events, 
which received global interest, there has been a reassertion at international level of the vital 
nature of protest for democracy and human rights.  The uprisings generated the recent U.N. 
Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
in the Context of Peaceful Protests at which delegates emphasized that “[g]uaranteeing 
human rights in the context of peaceful protests was at the essence of democratic 
participation” and that violence against protestors is a direct threat to democracy and 
potentially to international peace and security.
34
  The U.N. Human Rights Council has 
referred in a recent resolution on The Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association to the vital role of the right to freedom of association to the full enjoyment of all 
other rights.
35
  Reflecting the growing recognition of the importance of protest as a human 
right, the mandate of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association was established in 2010.
36
 As the Special Rapporteur stated in 
                                                          
29
 Mead outlines that protest can have a functional value for democracy, but can also have intrinsic value as the 
right of an individual. David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest, 6-8 (2010).  
30
  See above at p.4. 
31
 Fenwick makes the point that in the UK “...the groups tend to be made up of various disparate elements, 
including peaceful protesters and hard-core activists.” Fenwick, supra note 24, at 737. 
32
 For research indicating the effectiveness of protest, see e.g. Erik Johnson, Social Movement Size, 
Organizational Diversity and the Making of Federal Law, 86 Social Forces 967 (2008), Jon Agnone, Amplifying 
Public Opinion: The Policy Impact of the U.S. Environmental Movement, 85 Social Forces 1593 (2007), and 
Erik Johnson et. al., Where and How Do Movements Matter? The United States Environmental Movement and 
Congressional Hearings and Laws, 1961-1990, Paper presented at 
American Sociological Association 101st Annual Meetings 2006, Montréal, Canada (Aug. 11-14, 2006) 
available at  
http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/PLSC541_Fall06/Johnson_Agnone_McCarthy_March_2006.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 27 2012). 
33
 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Documented Death Toll from Protests Tops 300, Feb. 8, 2011, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/08/egypt-documented-death-toll-protests-tops-300 (last visited 
March 31, 2013). 
34
 Summary of the Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
in the Context of Peaceful Protests prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, adopted 19 December 2011, U.N. Hum. R. C., 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/40 (2011), at para. 45. 
35
 The Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, adopted 27 September 2010, U.N. Hum. R. 
C., 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/L.23 (2010), at 1. 
36
 The role of the Special Rapporteur is to examine issues relating to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association and to provide independent reports to the Human Rights Council of the U.N. See the website of the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of 
Peaceful Assembly and of Association, available at 
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the recent Panel Discussion on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Context 
of Peaceful Protests, protest is a means through which citizens can peacefully direct 
government attention to their issues.
37
  Because of the potential for protest as a peaceful 
alternative to violent means, the Rapporteur asserts, “[p]eaceful protest must thus be 
protected, and protected robustly.”38 
 
Protest is potentially as useful a tool for advancing the rights of children as it is for promoting 
those of other groups.  In 2005, the then Human Rights Commission recognized that freedom 
of assembly and association provide people with vital opportunities to, amongst other things, 
express political opinions.
39
  Protest has been described as being as important to a democratic 
society as voting, as “[b]oth are routes by which ideas can be promoted and debated.”40  It 
can then be argued that protest is particularly important for children, who are, for the most 
part, without the right to vote,
41
 and therefore have fewer avenues than adults through which 
to assert their interests.  
 
The Human Rights Council has emphasized that not only do individuals have a right to 
protest, but they also have a duty to strive for human rights.
42
  Children and young people are 
well placed to do this because they can be acutely aware of human rights issues and intensely 
interested in social justice.  Even young children may be capable of thinking logically and 
seeing things from the perspective of others, and the increased awareness of social issues of 
children, at least from the age of eleven, is well documented.
43
  Recent research points to the 
abilities of children from fourteen to seventeen years of age to reason in a sophisticated 
manner on complex questions relating to moral issues.
44
  Children consistently express that 
they wish to have greater participation in political matters,
45
 which is one of the reasons why 
Austria, for example, extended the right to vote to young people sixteen years and older.
46
  
Moreover, there are already examples of children organizing in order to further their own 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/AssemblyAssociation/Pages/SRFreedomAssemblyAssociationIndex.aspx (last 
visited March 31, 2013). 
37
 Summary of the Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
in the Context of Peaceful Protests prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, adopted 19 December 2011, U.N. Hum. R. C., 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/40 (2011), at para. 13. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Promoting the Rights to Peaceful Assembly and Association: Human Rights Resolution 2005/37, adopted 19 
April 2005, U.N. C. Hum. R., 57th Sess., U.N. Doc.  E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.11 (2005), at 1. 
40
 “Foreword” in Tom Wainwright et al., The Protest Handbook v (2012). 
41
 A handful of states have introduced the right to vote starting at age sixteen. See Aoife Daly, “Under-18s and 
the Right to Vote” in The Challenge of Human Rights: Past, Present and Future 268 (Keane and McDermott 
eds., 2012). 
42
 Agenda Item 3, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted 27 September 2010, U.N. Hum. R. C., 15th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/L.23 (2010), at 1. 
43
 John Santrock, A Topical Approach to Lifespan Development, 221 (2008). 
44
 Roberta Bosisio “Right” and “Not Right”: Representations of Justice in Young People 15 Ch. 290 (2008).  
45
 See e.g. Bob Franklin, Right to Vote: Children’s Rights means Citizen’s Rights, in Measuring Maturity: 
Understanding Children’s ‘Evolving Capacities’ 16-17 (Children’s Rights Information Network, 2009). 
46
 In one Austrian study, for example, the vast majority of children expressed that they wished for greater 
participation in local matters.  Unpublished report, Riepl and Riegler, Graz: Kommunale Beratungsstelle fur 
Kinder and Jugendinitiativen (1997). Cited in Gerison Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child, 5 
(2005). 
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interests.  The phenomenon of child workers forming their own organizations has been 
documented, and the contribution of such groups to social transformations in their localities 
has also been highlighted.
47
  In some areas, the members of these groups get involved in 
neighborhood initiatives to improve living conditions, and are accepted as useful partners in 
this exercise.
48
  Children have much to offer social justice movements in order to progress 
both their own interests as well as those of their communities generally. 
 
II. Children and Protest 
 
The category referred to as ‘children’, i.e. all those under eighteen, ranges from infants right 
up to individuals of seventeen years.
49
  Children of all ages can feature in protests.  Some, 
likely younger children, will have been brought there by parents.  Others, likely adolescents, 
will have come to have their own voices heard as individuals.  Because of the spectrum of 
ages and abilities of children, it is difficult to generalize about particular groups.  The U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), for example, does not categorize children by 
age, but instead recognizes the notion of the “evolving capacities of the child”,50 the principle 
that children’s capacities increase as they develop, and so too, therefore, does the ability of a 
child to exercise her own rights as opposed to adults exercising rights on her behalf.
51
  
Understandings of children’s capacities, maturity, and roles in society vary greatly across 
cultures and sub-cultures and are not always measured by age alone.
52
  Nevertheless, this 
Article primarily considers the right to protest for older children who have the ability to form 
views,
53
 and have attended a protest because they wish to make a point about the issue in 
question.  As noted above, these individuals will likely be adolescents,
54
 however, this is not 
to assert that it might never be appropriate for younger children to form views and attend a 
protest as well.  It seems particularly important to avoid setting a minimum age below which 
children should not attend protests because of the lack of attention children’s autonomy rights 
traditionally receive, primarily due to often mistaken assumptions that children will not, 
cannot, or should not exercise these rights.  For many children the reality is very different, 
and they have both the desire and the ability to exercise such rights. 
                                                          
47
 See Manfred Liebel, Working Children as Social Subjects: The Contribution of Working Children's 
Organizations to Social Transformations, 10 Ch. 265, 280 (2003). 
48
 Id. 
49
 The CRC states in Article 1 that “[f]or the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human 
being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” 
50
 CRC, Article 5. 
51
 See Lansdown, supra note 46, and Gerison Lansdown, ‘Evolving Capacities’ Explained, in Measuring 
Maturity: Understanding Children’s ‘Evolving Capacities’ 7-9 (Children’s Rights Information Network, 2009). 
52
 Lansdown, supra note 51, at 8. 
53
 See further Lansdown, supra note 46, and Roger Hart, Children's Participation: From Tokenism to Citizen 
(1992), examined below at Section 3.2. Whether their parents will give them permission is, of course, another 
matter altogether, and one which is beyond the scope of this Article.  The CRC recognizes that parents have 
primary responsibility for guiding children in the exercise of their rights, in accordance with the evolving 
capacities of the child (see e.g. Article 5). 
54
 See above references to Bosisio, supra note 44, who emphasizes the awareness of children about social issues, 
at least from age eleven.  This roughly corresponds with the onset of puberty and the accompanying (relative) 
independence of that stage of development.  For analysis of the diversity of ‘adolescences’ see Reed Larson & 
Suzanne Wilson,  Adolescence across Place and Time: Globalization and the Changing Pathways to Adulthood, 
in Handbook of Adolescent Psychology 299-330 (Richard Lerner and Laurence Steinberg, 2004). 
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As noted above, the right to freedom of assembly is well-established in international human 
rights law.  The right as it is included in other instruments could be argued to apply to 
children, yet the explicit inclusion of the right in Article 15
55
 of the CRC
56
 has provided 
welcome clarification that such a right does indeed exist for this group.  However, the lack of 
attention accorded to Article 15 or any of the autonomy rights in the CRC has been strongly 
related to fears of undermining the family unit
57
 despite the obvious support for parents and 
families in that instrument.
58
  It has also been due to notions about children’s capacities.59  It 
has been argued that, while some of these assumptions are logical, many others are unjustly 
discriminatory.
60
  There are clearly times when children cannot engage in the exercise of 
certain civil and political rights—for example, an infant cannot vote or instruct counsel.  Yet, 
there are other instances where the question of whether children should be excluded from 
exercising autonomy rights is far less clear-cut.  The blanket approach of the law to minority 
status for those under eighteen years creates an assumption of exclusion from certain 
activities for this group, even when this approach contradicts principles in other areas.  James 
and James have long highlighted the “ambivalence” with which society approaches the matter 
of children and their capacities.
61
  On the one hand children are held responsible for crimes 
from the age of ten in some jurisdictions, and yet at the same age are considered too 
vulnerable or unreliable to participate in family law proceedings regarding their own 
interests.
62
  
 
It is indeed the case that the capacities of children can differ from those of adults, but it is no 
longer acceptable to exclude all children from exercising autonomy rights on this basis.  
Children are often less experienced than adults and are likely to be less developed 
cognitively; however, there are inherent problems in viewing children through the prism of 
                                                          
55
 See further below at Section 5. Article 15 stipulates:  
1.  States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of association and to freedom of 
peaceful assembly. 
2.  No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those imposed in 
conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health 
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
56
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 
14, ¶ (1), U.N. Doc.  A/44/49 (1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 2 Sept. 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
57
 See e.g. Bruce Hafen & Jonathan Hafen, Abandoning Children to their Rights 55 Fir. Th. 18 (1995). The 
authors state that “the CRC is flawed by attitudes about autonomy that are ill-suited for children in any nation.” 
58
 The CRC describes the family as “the fundamental group of society” (Preamble) and states that parents are to 
provide “appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights” in the CRC (Article 5). 
59
 See Daly supra note 41; Daly, Considered or Merely Heard? The Views of the Young Children in Hague 
Convention Cases in Ireland, 12 Ir. J. Fam. L. 16 (2009); Michael Freeman, Review Essay: What’s Right with 
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adult ‘competence’.63 By doing this, we lose much of the lived experience of childhood and 
the conceptualization of children’s interests as they see them.  Although adults may genuinely 
intend to further children’s rights, they cannot claim to speak conclusively for children and 
young people, because they are not a member of that group.  Therefore, autonomy rights for 
children are vital—they recognize that children can and should speak for themselves.  Protest 
is, of course, an important means of ‘speaking’ for oneself.  Although children’s capacities 
are still evolving, they should not necessarily be excluded from protest.  Flekkoy and 
Kaufman contend that if competency were the sole determinant of citizenship, “many adults 
would also be excluded.”64  By the same token, many adults would find themselves excluded 
if the right to engage in peaceful protest were based on competency. 
 
Although the differences between adults and children must be acknowledged, they should not 
be overestimated.  There is an inherent problem in how we see children as ‘other’—as 
different from adults—as this makes it very convenient to exclude children from mainstream 
society.  This problem is as applicable to protest as it is to other areas, such as voting.  It is 
undeniable, however, that children will have particular needs in the context of protest that are 
different to those of adults.  Children will, at least until their adolescence years, be smaller in 
stature than adults, and may therefore be more vulnerable in the context of violent protests.
65
  
Children have, in general, less life experience which may also render them more vulnerable 
and open to exploitation in certain scenarios.  Moreover, their minority status may raise 
particularly difficult issues:  children who wish to protest may be constrained by issues 
relating to parental consent, school guidelines, and minimum ages.  For example, some states 
have established a minimum age below which one may not organize a protest.
66
 
 
Theories which attempt to broaden the notion of citizenship have developed as the thinking 
regarding children’s ‘participation’ rights has evolved.67  These theories can be useful for 
conceptualizing a right to peaceful protest for children.  Citizenship theories “need to be 
sufficiently flexible to encompass child development rather than competency.”68  Cockburn 
rejects the ‘adult’ model of citizenship for children and argues instead for a new type of 
citizenship which can accommodate the special position of children rather than using it as a 
basis for exclusion.
69
  This model involves a re-conceptualization of citizenship in order to 
recognize the interdependence of human beings and to value children as the human beings 
                                                          
63
 James, supra note 62, at 170-171. 
64
 Malfred Grude Flekkoy and Natalie Hevener Kaufman, The Participation Rights of the Child: Rights and 
Responsibilities in Family and Society (1997). Cited in Geraldine Van Bueren, Multigenerational Citizenship: 
The Importance of Recognizing Children as National and International Citizens, 633 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci. 30, 33 (2011). 
65
 Mead makes the point, however, that for the purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights, if a 
demonstration becomes violent, it does not follow that those present lose the protection of that Convention. 
Mead, note 29, at 67. 
66
 For example, Turkey has been criticized for setting the minimum age at nineteen. See Concluding 
Observations: Turkey, adopted 20 Jul. 2012, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, 60th Sess., ¶ 38, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/C/R/CO/2-3 (2012), considered further below. 
67
 See Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights, Participation and Citizenship 6 Ch. 475 (1999). 
68
 Van Bueren, supra note 64, at 33. 
69
 Tom Cockburn, Children and Citizenship in Britain, 5 Ch. 99, 113 (1998). 
10 
 
they are in the present, not just as future adults.
70
  Children should not be seen solely as a 
group which is different to adults but instead as a group which has a “central component in 
society.”71  In the context of protest, children should not be seen solely as a group with the 
right to protest as adults do.  Instead, they should be seen as a group with as much interest in 
protest as adults, but one which may have particular needs which must be met to allow them 
to exercise the right.  
 
III. Risks for Children in the Context of Protest 
 
In the modern, liberal context of the geographic ‘West’, children are primarily conceptualized 
as vulnerable, helpless, and incapable.
72
  This notion of children is changing within 
disciplines such as psychology and law as it is increasingly recognized that children have 
been underestimated in their capacities.
73
  This new conceptualization of children has started 
to permeate popular notions about their abilities.  As noted above, however, there is no doubt 
that children have specific vulnerabilities due to the physical differences between children 
and adults, as well as the less developed capacities that children may have compared to 
adults.  This section considers the potential dangers of protest for children, including the 
physical dangers as well as the risk that children could be manipulated into protest activity.  It 
also explores the argument that children should be shielded from the adult world and that 
they should not be involved in protest. 
 
A.  Risks to Children’s Physical Safety 
 
It is inescapable that protests can involve a risk of violence.  As noted above, children may be 
at greater risk than adults in such circumstances because they are generally smaller in stature.  
This raises the argument that the need for special protection for children should be factored 
into laws and guidance relating to protests.  Veerman and Levine state that in the context of 
violent protests, “[m]inors taking part in violent demonstrations (as in the Palestinian 
uprising) need to be protected differently from adults.”74  Although the authors were referring 
to violent demonstrations, the same can be said for the increasingly important arena of 
peaceful protests.  Even originally benign protests can turn dangerous, and the special needs 
of children should be addressed to account for this scenario.  
 
Another point relating to the dangers posed by protest is that, during times of unrest in a 
society, children can become particular targets for groups looking to perpetrate violence on a 
population.  Van Bueren theorizes that the phenomenon of targeting children may be used as 
a tool to subjugate communities, “creating general unease.”75  This has certainly appeared to 
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be a feature of violence occurring in Syria between 2011–2013.76  The report of a U.N. 
commission of inquiry, established in 2011 by the Human Rights Council, appears to 
document a phenomenon of children being targeted for violence by security forces.
77
  It was 
reported to the commission that children had been killed and injured by security forces at 
numerous demonstrations.
78
  The commission also found widespread reports of torture of 
children in custody, as well as sexual abuse of boys in front of adult prisoners.
79
  The Syrian 
situation demonstrates the trend highlighted by Van Bueren of the use of children as tools to 
harm adults, in this case, adults of a resistant population.
80
  It also points to the need to 
consider the particular vulnerabilities of children during demonstrations. 
 
B.  The Risk that Children Could be Manipulated 
 
The risk that children can be manipulated for the purpose of protest could possibly be a 
concern.  Older children could be encouraged by adults to take part in protests in order to 
further the interests of those adults.  Some groups may find it useful, for example, to include 
children in order to increase the numbers participating in a protest.  Children can and are used 
as tools to evoke emotions and to shock.  For example, in 1989, parents brought children to 
an anti-abortion rally outside a family-planning clinic in the United States.
81
  Though the 
Article did not mention the ages of the children, it did note the presence of a baby.
82
  A pro-
choice demonstrator remarked that including children as protesters was “manipulative and 
abusive” and that the children were probably not old enough to understand the relevant 
issues.
83
  Defending their presence, the organizer of the protest stated that “[m]any of the 
children know their parents have been active in picketing, and the desire of a lot of children 
was to participate.”84 
 
To contextualize this difficult scenario, it is useful to consider Hart’s “ladder of 
participation”.85  This denotes degrees to which children’s participation may affect certain 
matters affecting them.
86
  The spectrum ranges from “manipulation” (which does not 
constitute genuine participation) right up to instances of children sharing decision-making 
with adults.
87
  Hart states that manipulation may involve instances of pre-schoolers carrying 
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placards when they do not understand the issue.
88
  According to Hart, adults feel that the ends 
justify the means, as the issue impacts children.
89
  This may be misguided rather than 
manipulative, according to Hart.
90
  “Social mobilization” of children, such as children 
engaging in marches, however, has the potential to facilitate genuine participation.  Hart 
writes that although it is easy to dismiss such marches as non-participation even where 
children are sent by adults to march “[s]uch events may have considerable merit for the 
children nevertheless, particularly when the issue concerns children, is understood by them, 
and is deemed by them to be important.”91  The cultural context must also be examined in 
order to determine whether such examples are genuine participation, and Hart opines that 
there can be a continuum, ranging “from regime-instigated to voluntary activity.” 92  
According to Hart, boy scouts being sent out to clean up after an event would not be genuine 
participation; however, if they had been taught about the effects of pollution, had views on it, 
and actually wished to do it, then this could be categorized as genuine participation.
93
  
Applying this theory to the abortion rally scenario, the type of participation children engage 
in depends on the context of that rally for an individual child.  If the child was familiar with 
the issues, felt strongly about them, and actually wished to accompany her parents, then this 
could constitute genuine participation. 
 
Another challenging example which raises questions about the voluntariness of children’s 
participation in protest arises in the context of Syria.  In 2011, children were reported to be 
engaging in children-only protests against the regime.
94
  The pattern of arrest and torture of 
children by the regime clearly renders this activity dangerous for children.  Whether adults 
encouraged children to engage in children-only protests was unclear.
95
  It is possible that anti-
regime adults may have manipulated children into action in an attempt to gain headlines and 
to provoke further sympathy for their cause by purposely placing children in danger, yet the 
children apparently began to protest when the traditional public celebrations to mark the end 
of Ramadan, which are particular to children, were forbidden,
96
 indicating that they were 
protesting about an issue directly relating to them.  If the children felt that it was in their 
interests to protest and understood the risks they were taking, then arguably this could 
constitute genuine participation, at least within the framework of Hart’s ‘Ladder’. 
 
It is easy to overstate the argument that the involvement of children in protest constitutes 
adult manipulation.  The growing recognition that children may have views on various 
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matters affecting them is recognized by Article 12 of the CRC
97
 and reflected in the 
increasing numbers of national Youth Parliaments
98
 and other initiatives supporting children 
to contribute their views in political matters.  Adults too can be manipulated by third parties 
to protest in the interests of those parties, yet we would not seek to prevent adult participation 
on this basis.  Children, like adults, are influenced by various organizations as well as their 
communities and neighborhoods, and they are “enmeshed in a web of potential political and 
civic influences.”99  Moreover, it is clear that adults have an ambivalent attitude toward the 
validity of the involvement of children in protests.  Recent research on the involvement of 
young people in protests against the Iraq war highlighted that the approval of the media of 
young people’s right to protest depended on the stance of the particular newspaper towards 
the war.
100
 
 
Clearly, however, there are instances where children simply cannot grasp the issues which are 
the subject of protest.  The baby reported at the abortion rally in 1989, for example, would 
not have been capable of comprehending anything about that matter.  Whether or not parents 
should bring small children to protests is contentious.  At Rung 2 of Hart’s ladder, children 
are “decoration.” 101   Decoration, like “manipulation”, is held by Hart not to constitute 
genuine participation.
102
  Hart explains that this stage involves “those frequent occasions 
when children are given T-shirts related to some cause, and may sing or dance at an event in 
such dress, but have little idea of what it is all about.” 103   This does not constitute 
manipulation because adults do not attempt to falsely portray the children involved as the 
instigators.  It does, however, potentially use children as tools in an attempt to further the 
cause of adults.
104
  This said, it can be argued that the visible presence of infants normalizes 
their existence beyond the interests of the adults that have brought them there, and to 
explicitly exclude infants would exclude them from public space.
105
  It must also be 
considered that parents have the right to include their children in a protest as an educational 
and/or cultural exercise.
106
  Nevertheless, possibly a more straight-forward and pertinent 
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issue for current discussion, is the involvement of children who have the capacity to 
understand and to form views to some degree about the social or political matters involved. 
 
C.  Protecting Children from Adult Issues? 
 
Considering the contentious issues discussed above, it is understandable that adults may have 
a desire to ‘protect’ children from involvement in protest.  Some may take issue with 
facilitating children to be involved in what could be considered adult issues of policy and 
politics, yet, the dangers of excluding children must also be considered.  We expect adults, 
such as parents’ and children’s rights groups, to campaign for children’s issues on behalf of 
children.  It is arguable, however, that they are not sufficiently successful.  The neglect of 
children’s interests is evident in a broad number of areas—children are far more likely than 
adults to live in poverty, for example.
107
  Van Bueren makes the point that “without de jure 
recognition of their citizenship responsibilities, children become more vulnerable and not 
less.”108  She points to the example of child-headed households such as the households run by 
children orphaned by AIDS in South Africa,
109
 and the clear barrier that these households 
face where policy dictates that social security payments are not made to children.
110
  This 
example of children assuming responsibilities yet not the corresponding rights indicates that 
many are capable of, and should be acknowledged as having, the cognitive capacity for 
mobilization to assert collective child-oriented interests. 
 
Moreover, the phenomenon of modern technology has created a backdrop whereby children 
have easy access to information and are therefore less likely to remain unaware of local and 
global politics and events.
111
  The ill-fated Kony 2012 campaign highlighted that young 
people can be mobilized in enormous numbers on social issues, and that social media can be 
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a powerful tool for this purpose.
112
  In spite of the fear, often evoked by the media, about the 
dangers of the internet for children, the medium presents huge opportunities for children’s 
civil and political rights.  It facilitates them in breaking from their traditional confinement in 
the private sphere by allowing them to engage from a home PC with others with similar 
interests and consequently encounter social and political issues.
113
  In the United States, 
exposure to information online has been associated positively with political participation.
114
  
Such engagement indicates a re-emergence of political activism and democratic participation, 
equipping a new generation with the capacity for effecting societal change.
115
  Examples of 
broader social justice campaigns are also starting to emerge.  In 2011 there was widespread 
activism in Chile to demand reform in education and energy policies.
116
 High school and 
university students have reportedly been the most vocal and successful, conducting extensive 
on-line campaigns for social change.
117
  By the end of 2011 public opinion support for the 
movement stood at 79%. This indicates the success that young people can have, and the 
efficacy of social media as a tool to achieve change.
118
 
 
The value of participation as a learning experience during childhood and adolescence is 
gaining increased recognition.
119
  Children will not become competent to participate in public 
life overnight once they reach the age of eighteen.  Therefore, they should have opportunities 
to engage during their childhood years in order to learn how to do so
120
  Arguably, 
participation will not only teach them that they have rights, but it will also help them to 
understand that these rights may have to be restricted because of conflicts with the rights of 
others.
121
  The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, the monitoring body for the CRC, 
has opined that “children cannot be expected to mature into full members of society if they 
lack the experience of participation in school and community life.”122  The ability of young 
people to get involved in activism on a matter of importance to them was strongly 
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emphasized during the 2006 immigrant rights demonstrations and boycotts in the United 
States.
123
  Getrich interviewed teenagers who had organized and marched in protests in order 
to oppose proposed laws that would have had a detrimental effect on themselves, family and 
friends.
124
  They had “strong opinions” 125  which they were eager to express.  Getrich 
determined that it was a very formative experience for these teenagers, and that it resulted in 
a feeling of belonging in their society.
126
  Not only did the teenagers find that the protests 
raised awareness of issues of vital importance to them, but also that the protests affirmed their 
identities.
127
 
 
The value to society generally is also potentially significant where children engage in protest.  
Hart makes the point that children, particularly teenagers, “struggle to find meaningful roles 
in society”, and suggests that if they are unable to find roles that facilitate responsibility, they 
may be more likely to find roles that promote irresponsibility.
128
  Hart also emphasizes the 
potential community organization benefits of children’s participation, stating that: 
 
‘Communities’, in the broadest sense of the word, are constructed.  To support 
children or youth in working together is, by definition, to be engaged in community 
development.  Through positive group experiences children discover that organizing 
can work in their self-interest.  Such mutual self-interest is probably the strongest base 
for cultural and political organization.
129
 
 
It is also likely that those who have engaged in protest will take more of an interest in their 
communities and in democratic processes later in life.
130
  Getrich raises the possibility that, in 
the context of the Latino protests, “the teens’ activism in the realm of nonelectoral politics 
will translate into an increase in voting rates for this demographic.”131  There are, therefore, 
solid utilitarian reasons for encouraging and facilitating children to take interest in social 
issues, including through protest. 
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IV. The Recent Evolution of Protest 
 
The use of traditional mass protest appears to have increased in recent years as a tool to 
achieve social change.
132
  The evolution in protest has involved a number of factors which are 
relevant to children’s rights.  One factor has been an increase in protest in states like Syria 
which have regimes unafraid to target children.
133
  Another factor is that there appears to be 
an increase in protest relating to issues affecting children more than other groups, such as cuts 
to education budgets.
134
  Additionally, the increase in protest has led to developments in 
policing techniques, such as ‘kettling’135 that affect protesting children particularly acutely.136  
 
The uprisings in the Arab world, which primarily began with demonstrations, are perhaps the 
most visible example of increased resort to protest.  On January 14, 2011, after four weeks of 
demonstrations in Tunisia against the ruling regime, Dictator Ben Ali fled the country, 
igniting the Arab Spring—an era of protest and political change across the Arab region.137  
These civil uprisings, which have shared techniques of protests, demonstrations, and rallies, 
have ultimately lead to the ousting of dictators in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen.
138
  
There are numerous reasons for these uprisings; however, a notable demographic feature of 
these uprisings has been the presence of a large number of dissatisfied young people (both 
over and under the age of eighteen) amongst the populations in question, prompting some 
commentators to go so far as to refer to the Arab Spring as “Youthquake.”139  These young 
people were dissatisfied, but they were also well-educated and had access to social media.
140
  
These factors contributed to the spread of the dynamic of protest across the region.  That the 
Syria uprising was sparked by children spray-painting slogans
141
 shows that it is not only 
university students involved in protest, but school children as well. 
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It is not just the Arab world which has seen an increased resort to protest.  In 2009, before the 
Arab Spring, Dalton et. al. argued that, whilst protest was once considered unconventional, in 
many ‘Western’ countries petitions and protests could be seen to rival the perhaps more 
traditional activity of electoral campaigning.
142
  The authors also claimed at that time that 
longitudinal research pointed to an increase in levels of protest, even in nations which were 
developing economically and politically.
143
  Moreover, the 2003 attack on Iraq
144
 as well as 
anti-globalization movements, have also contributed to greater visibility of mass protest.
145
  
Unfortunately, alongside what may be the ‘normalization’ of protest, there has arguably been 
an increase in controversial policing of protest.  In the Global North, the phenomenon and 
discourse of protest has also become more contested, and protest has become more 
criminalized and less attractive.
146
  Klein points to a measurable increase in the United States 
in the severity of the security tactics used by authorities in order to counter protests at recent 
summits.
147
  She argues that the increase in violent policing has resulted in a situation where 
such violence is no longer a rare event but an expected outcome, and she suggests that tactics 
such as pre-emptive arrests and the indiscriminate use of pepper spray and tear gas have 
criminalized legitimate dissent.
148
  The increase in heavy-handed tactics has not been 
confined solely to the United States.  The G20 summit in Canada in 2010 resulted in the mass 
arrest and detention of over 1,100 people, 800 of whom were never charged with an 
offense.
149
 They were arrested for ‘breach of the peace’, a law inherited by Canada from 
English common law.
150
  
 
In England and Wales, this doctrine has been referred to as being so broad and imprecise that 
“it provides the police with such wide powers to use against protesters as to render the 
statutory frameworks almost redundant.”151  There has been an increase in litigation relating 
to protest in England and Wales, with a notable criminalization of various forms of dissent.
152
  
The protection of the right to freedom of speech in England and Wales is not as strong as in 
the United States, where even expression constituting hate speech is usually protected by the 
First Amendment to the U.S Constitution, forming part of “the highest rung of its hierarchy 
of values”.153  This legacy has consequently led to a number of cases in which the free speech 
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of school children has been upheld by U.S courts; the most famous case upholding the right 
to wear armbands protesting the Vietnam war.
154
  In England and Wales however, provisions 
such as Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which states that an offense can be 
committed where one engages in threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behavior that is 
likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress, have been fiercely criticized.
155
  Another highly 
contentious issue is the increasing use globally by police of ‘containment’, or ‘kettling’156, 
whereby protestors (and potentially bystanders) are confined in a limited area by using 
extensive cordons of police officers, often in very uncomfortable conditions for hours at a 
time.
157
 
 
Recent striking developments in the area of protest have involved increasingly draconian 
measures in the Global North and youth-lead uprisings in the Arab world.  As involvement of 
children has increased, so too have difficulties for these children.
158
  It is, therefore, important 
to examine whether international standards are sufficient to account for the particular needs 
of children in the context of protest. 
  
V. Protest and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child   
 
A.  The Text of Article 15 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child   
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As noted above,
159
 the main international and regional human rights treaties relating to civil 
and political rights contain a number of provisions on the right to freedom of assembly and of 
association.  Theoretically these apply to children as they do to adults, however the minority 
status of children leaves somewhat of a grey area when it comes to those provisions usually 
considered ‘adult’.  This was one of the main reasons for drafting the CRC, which was 
ground-breaking for explicitly including for the first time in international law autonomy 
rights specific to children.
160
  The primary construction of such rights for children is 
contained in Article 12, which stipulates that children should be heard in all matters affecting 
them.
161
  This is a far-reaching right which should be implemented in a variety of contexts, 
such as the family, school, and the courts.
162
  It is also a child-specific provision in that there 
is an assumption that adults will generally have the freedom to make their own decisions as 
well as decisions for children, but that children should therefore be heard when this is the 
case.  The CRC also includes, however, provisions specifically mirroring those of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) relating to freedoms common 
to adults.  These include the right to freedom of expression (Article 13 CRC), freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (Article 14 CRC), and the right to freedom of association 
and to freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 15 CRC).  Article 15 stipulates that: 
 
1.  States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of association and to 
freedom of peaceful assembly. 
2.  No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those 
imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.
163
 
 
The text of Article 15(1) is similar to equivalent provisions in other instruments.  The primary 
difference between the CRC right and the ICCPR right is that the ICCPR separates out 
assembly and association.
164
  This is a point that was noted by the CRC drafters, who 
acknowledged that the reason for this separation – i.e. the matter of joining trade unions – did 
not need to be addressed by the CRC.
165
  Similarly, the CRC Article 15 is almost identical to 
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the ECHR right enshrined in Article 11, save for the difference that the ECHR right adds 
“including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”166 
 
The conditions on the right contained in Article 15(2) are also identical to those contained in 
Article 21 of the ICCPR regarding the right of peaceful assembly.  The drafters of the CRC 
were determined not to impose restrictions in this provision that did not exist in equivalent 
international treaties.
167
 For example, a proposal that the right could be restricted in the 
interest of “morals” was rejected on the basis that it was incompatible with Article 22 of the 
ICCPR (the right to freedom of association), and also that it would be operating from the 
assumption of children acting against their own interests.
168
  It is also largely identical to the 
ECHR restrictions in Article 11 (the right to freedom of assembly and association), differing 
where the wording in the ECHR further specifies that “[t]his article shall not prevent the 
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed 
forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”169 
 
The text of Article 15 of the CRC, therefore, permits the reader to reasonably conclude that 
children are to enjoy the right to freedom of assembly and association to the extent that adults 
do.  However, the need to protect children—perhaps best encapsulated by the “best interest” 
principle enshrined in Article 3 of the CRC—means that in practice it is likely that there will 
be special considerations when it comes to the enjoyment of these rights by children.
170
  It is 
necessary therefore to examine whether the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
progressed in its understanding of the nature of Article 15 of the CRC and whether there are 
any distinctions between children and adults in this regard.  
 
B.  Comments of the Committee on the Rights of the Child   
 
State parties are required to submit reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child every 
five years.
171
  The Committee stipulated in its reporting guidelines that the report should 
contain the category “civil rights and freedoms”, and Article 15 is included in this 
category.
172
  The Committee regularly makes concluding observations on state reports,
173
 
providing an amount of useful clarification on the provisions of the CRC.  The comments are 
nevertheless disparate, are sometimes inconsistent, and consequently do not constitute a 
thorough analysis of Article 15.
174
  Many of the concluding observations do not reference 
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Article 15.  Moreover, the comments are not generally considered to be binding on States 
Parties to the CRC, although it is arguable that states are obliged to consider the concluding 
observations of the Committee when interpreting an article of the CRC.
175
  These documents 
are certainly of immense value for the purposes of providing guidance on how to implement a 
particular right.
176
  It must also be highlighted that standards emphasized by the Committee, 
which already have binding status in other instruments such as the ICCPR, will, of course, be 
themselves binding as a matter of international law.  
 
 1.  Committee Concern Regarding Legislative Obstacles 
 
States Parties to the CRC have an obligation to ensure that legislation is in conformity with 
that instrument.
177
  An examination of recent concluding observations of the Committee 
establishes that the Committee has given some attention to legislative obstacles to Article 15 
at domestic level.  The Committee noted restrictions, for example, on the right to freedom of 
association in the case of Vietnam,
178
 and urged the state to “amend its legislation, inter alia, 
by expediting the adoption of the Law on Associations.” 179   In the case of Cuba, the 
Committee referenced specific provisions in the constitution of that state which restrict 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and of association, urging reform of those 
provisions.
180
  The prohibition on children demonstrating or forming associations in Ukraine 
was also noted in the concluding observations of the Committee, and the Committee called 
upon Ukraine to reform relevant laws.
181
  The Committee expressed concern at legislation in 
Costa Rica restricting the right to freedom of association of children for political purposes.
182
 
 
In the case of Turkey, the Committee also highlighted legislative obstacles to the right; for 
example, nineteen is the minimum age for organizing outdoor meetings, and there are 
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extensive bureaucratic procedures faced by those wishing to establish an association.
183
  The 
Committee recommended that Turkey amend its legislation “to remove the remaining 
obstacles to these rights, including the minimum age for forming an organizational committee 
for outdoor meetings.”184  The Committee further made reference to freedoms of the minority 
Kurdish group in Turkey, expressing “deep concern about the reports of ill-treatment and 
torture of children, especially Kurdish children who have been involved in political 
assemblies and activities, in prisons, police stations, vehicles and on the streets.”185  In 2001 
the Committee also questioned Turkey about similar reports regarding Kurdish children,
186
 
however, the concluding observations made reference only to issues relating to “freedom of 
expression.”187  Therefore, this extended reference to “political assemblies and activities” in 
the 2012 concluding observations appears to constitute an evolution from the brief reference 
made in the 2001 report. 
 
The comments of the Committee on the report of Belarus provides further evidence that the 
Committee has, at times, been consistent in raising the issue of Article 15 with states who 
have continuously performed poorly with regard  to that right.  Belarus was questioned by the 
Committee in relation to its Second Report in 2002.
188
  In that report, the Committee had 
recommended that Belarus fully guarantee to all children the rights to freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and access to appropriate information, 
emphasizing Articles 13, 15, and 17 of the CRC.
189
  In the 2011 state report of Belarus, the 
Committee expressed concern about the detention of teenagers during demonstrations at the 
time of the presidential elections in December 2010.
190
  The Committee restated its 2002 
recommendation to Belarus, recommending the state fully guarantee relevant rights, but, as 
with the case of the concluding recommendations in Turkey, the Committee went beyond this 
in the 2011 report on Belarus, referencing relevant national legislation in Belarus as well as 
demonstrating an understanding of the particular background to the protest.
191
  This perhaps 
indicates closer analysis of the issue than in 2002, possibly due either to the continuing nature 
of the problem in Belarus, or an increased focus on protest in later reports, or both.  
 
2.  The Arab Spring- Obligations to Protect and to Educate Officials 
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In recent reports, the Committee made particular reference to Arab Spring-related protest in 
the case of both Bahrain and Syria.  In the Committee’s concluding observations on the report 
of Bahrain it stated that the rights to freedom of assembly and of association “are not always 
respected, including during the recent events of 2011, particularly for children” and urged 
Bahrain to take all measures to ensure the implementation of these rights.
192
  In the case of 
Syria, the Committee noted that the right to freedom of association and to assembly was not 
respected in the state in practice.
193
  The obligation to protect the right to life is a long-
established principle of international human rights law,
194
 so it is unsurprising that the 
Committee would call attention to the obligation to protect children’s safety in Syria where 
security forces killed children during the Arab Spring.
195
  The Committee criticized Syria for 
relying “on the parents to protect their children during demonstrations . . .”196  This is a 
significant point highlighting that states, not just parents, have obligations towards the safety 
of children exposed to or involved in protests.  The Committee expressed particular concern 
for the arrest and detention of the school children accused of painting anti-Government 
graffiti in March 2011 in Dara’a,197 urging Syria in strong language “[t]o take all necessary 
measures to ensure the full effective implementation by all, including parents, teachers and 
security forces, of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association and peaceful 
assembly, in accordance with articles 13 and 15 of the Convention.
”198
 
 
This points to potential obligations of states to educate state officials and employees with  
regard to the right of children to protest, including education on how to achieve 
“implementation”, (i.e. how to facilitate children to engage in protest).  The Committee also 
expressed deep concern about the detention of children in connection with the protests, as 
well as reports of the deaths of some of these children whilst in custody, and strongly urged 
Syria to release such children immediately and unconditionally.
199
 
 
3.  Identifying Further Positive Obligations Associated with Article 15 
 
The Committee has emphasized both the positive obligation that states have to ensure their 
legislation is compatible with freedom of assembly and association, and the obligation to 
protect children’s safety in protest.  These obligations have already been long established 
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through interpretation of ICCPR rights.
200
  However, the Committee has, in recent reports, 
provided guidance on the right of children to freedom of assembly and association, which 
appears to progress understanding of Article 15.
201
  It was noted in 2012 that in Myanmar 
children have little opportunity to exercise their right to association save through 
government-controlled NGOs.
202
   The Committee recommended that, inter alia, Myanmar 
take measures “to encourage children to form associations on their own initiative.”203  This 
points to a positive obligation to ‘encourage’ children in this regard, and to ensure that 
opportunities are not solely government-related,
204
 presumably because of the conflict of 
interest which can exist when initiatives are funded or run by the government.  Interestingly, 
the Committee had also questioned Myanmar in 1997 on the matter of the prohibition of 
gatherings of more than five people in public, and the consequences which that may have for 
the freedom of expression of children.
205
  It was then recommended in the concluding 
observations of 1997 that Myanmar take “all necessary measures” in order to ensure 
conformity with, inter alia, freedom of association under the CRC.
206
  Taken together with 
the focus of the Committee on the matter in the 2012 report, it appears to constitute another 
example of the consistency of the Committee in its focus on Article 15 in a state which has 
demonstrated unwillingness to facilitate it. 
 
In another progressive step, the Committee considered the issue of the potential for conflict 
between the views of parents and those of children in its consideration of the second report of 
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Japan in 2004.
207
 The Committee expressed concern that children required parental consent to 
become members of an association, and recommended that Japan review relevant legislation 
in order to implement CRC standards.
208
  Though its language could have been stronger, the 
Committee appears to be making the point that it is contrary to the CRC to require children to 
obtain parental consent before joining an association.  Although the Committee did not 
specify mass protest in this context, the standard should be the same for children who wish to 
partake in a particular protest, that is, they should not be required by law to seek parental 
consent.
209
   
 
 4.  The Committee’s Contribution 
 
Recent events such as the Arab Spring demonstrations have brought the issues of children 
and protest to the attention of the Committee.  The increase is not, perhaps, as great as could 
be expected or desired, considering recent global events whereby children and young people 
have been extensively involved in protest.  It must be considered that since the reporting 
process is a lengthy one, with state reports sometimes takings years to draft, information from 
the state itself may not always be current.  It is also possible that civil society organizations 
are failing to focus on the right, and much of the information on which the Committee’s 
comments are based is provided by such organizations in shadow reports.  Nevertheless, it is 
expected that the Committee would pay particular attention to states where protest has been 
prominent.  It is particularly notable that the Committee did not take the opportunity to 
examine the state report of Egypt in July 2011, in order to comment on the right to freedom 
of assembly in that state in the wake of the Arab Spring uprising earlier that year.
210
  Children 
were detained and abused during those protests.
211
  Yet the Committee gave 
recommendations in relation to the treatment of children in recent demonstrations after 
considering the state reports of Syria and Bahrain,
212
 perhaps demonstrating an inconsistent 
approach. 
 
The Committee has been criticized for not taking enough of the opportunities provided to it to 
examine child-specific aspects of civil rights, and freedoms and to accordingly build a strong 
and consistent jurisprudence elucidating the area.
213
  Based on an examination of recent 
reports it is clear, however, that the Committee is tending to make occasional reference to 
state practice regarding Article 15 and other articles related to protest.  The Committee has 
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also been consistent in commenting on violations of Article 15 in the cases of Myanmar, 
Belarus and Turkey.
214
  Some progressive interpretations of Article 15 are being provided.  
For example, the Committee has emphasized the positive obligation of states to facilitate 
children in exercising freedom of assembly and association,
215
 the obligation to ensure that 
officials implement children’s protest rights (which logically implies that officials must be 
educated on this),
216
 and the obligation to refrain from considering the safety of children at 
demonstrations to be a matter solely for parents.
217
  The Committee has also included 
recommendations for some (but not all) states where the well-being of children during 
political demonstrations has been at issue, such as in Syria and Bahrain.
218
 
 
 
A notable feature of the comments of the Committee is that the monitoring body has not 
emphasized the dangers of protest for children because of their status, nor has it sought to 
limit the right for children on this or any other basis.  This indicates a presumption in favor of 
children enjoying the right to protest on an equal basis with adults.  This inclination is further 
consolidated by the Committee’s suggestion that Japan was not fully compliant with the CRC 
in legally requiring children to have parental permission to join associations.
219
  This 
vindication of children’s freedom rights is to be welcomed, and is consistent with the 
intention of the drafters of Article 15, who sought to avoid placing restrictions on the right for 
children that did not apply to adults.
220
  Yet, the Committee has failed to place sufficient 
emphasis on the fact that children are particularly vulnerable in protest.  State obligations to 
protect children’s safety in protest have been highlighted. 221   However, for the reasons 
outlined above,
222
 children, compared to adults, can be at particular risk in the context of 
protest, and the Committee has not acknowledged this in its comments.  The Committee 
could have, for example, expanded on the instruction to Syria to take all measures to ensure 
implementation of the right by authorities.
223
  The Committee could have specified the need 
to ensure that authorities explicitly considered children’s vulnerabilities when planning crowd 
control techniques.  Strong guidance on this point would undoubtedly be of value for the 
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purpose of clarifying the nature of state obligations, at the very least to ensure clear guidance 
for domestic courts when called upon to determine relevant issues.
224
 
 
The nature of the reporting process, where a broad range of rights are considered in brief, 
leads to little meaningful focus on the right itself.  Therefore, understanding of the nature of 
Article 15 has not been extensively developed by the Committee.  The lack of emphasis in 
shadow reports may also be partly responsible for this lack of understanding.  This lacuna 
may also point to a need for the Committee to request further information from states about 
children’s freedom rights generally, and those relating to protest in particular.  Hopefully the 
individual complaints procedure for the CRC will result in further consideration of autonomy 
rights for children, including matters relating to protest, once Optional Protocol No.3, which 
provides for an individual complaints mechanism for CRC rights, enters into force.
225
 
 
VI. Children, Protest and Positive Obligations 
 
It is important to examine issues regarding children and protest not only in the context of the 
CRC but also within the broader framework of state obligations owed to children under 
international human rights law.  A prominent model
226
 is the tripartite approach of ‘respect, 
protect, fulfil’, 227  which acknowledges a sliding scale between negative and positive 
obligations while avoiding a problematic dichotomy between the two.
228
  While often 
referred to in the context of economic, social and cultural rights, the framework is also widely 
held to apply equally to civil and political rights.
229
  
 
Eide described the first category of state obligations as follows: “The obligation to respect 
requires the State, and thereby all its organs and agents, to abstain from doing anything that 
violates the integrity of the individual or infringes on her or his freedom.” 230   The 
requirement that states ensure that their officials abstain from killing and torturing children 
involved in protest, as is currently occurring in Syria, clearly falls under this heading.
231
  Of 
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the second requirement, Eide states; “The obligation to protect requires from the State and its 
agents the measures necessary to prevent other individuals or groups from violating the 
integrity, freedom of action or other human rights of the individual . . . ”232 This means that 
the state would also be obliged to ensure protection of protesting children from third parties.  
For example, states may have to ensure that rallies of child workers are not attacked by gang 
masters and their associates.
233
The final obligation, according to Eide’s model, is the 
obligation to fulfil, which “requires the State to take the measures necessary to ensure for 
each person within its jurisdiction opportunities to obtain satisfaction of those needs, 
recognized in the human rights instruments, which cannot be secured by personal efforts.”234  
The obligation to fulfil requires the state to take positive action towards full realization of 
rights, including appropriate legislative, judicial, budgetary, and other measures.
235
  This 
reflects the concept of ‘positive obligations’ which has been long-established in international 
human rights law.  It is this aspect of state obligations which appears to require the greatest 
emphasis in light of recent developments regarding children and protest, due to children’s 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Positive obligations are inherent within international and regional human rights law 
instruments covering civil and political rights.  References to the obligation to protect 
children are also found in those instruments.  The ICCPR right to freedom of assembly 
attempts to facilitate a democratic aim “in the process of forming, expressing and 
implementing political opinions”,236  placing states under a stronger positive obligation to 
facilitate freedom of assembly than that for civil rights relating to private interests.
237
  Nowak 
suggests that these duties may include the free use of rooms in which to assemble, redirection 
of traffic, or police protection.
238
  That instrument also stipulates that every child has the right 
to measures of protection “as are required by his status as a minor,”239 and therefore positive 
duties toward children and protest on the basis of their status will require those which 
facilitate children to engage in protest where they wish to do so. 
 
A number of points can also be made about the responsibility to fulfil positive obligations 
and the status of children under the CRC.  The Article 15 CRC right to freedom of assembly 
and association is to be interpreted together with Article 3 of the CRC, the obligation that 
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states consider the best interest of the child.  Article 3 is a ‘guiding principle’ of the CRC, in 
that all other articles must be interpreted with it in mind.
240
  Article 3 recognizes children’s 
particular vulnerabilities and the fact that adults will often make decisions on behalf of 
children.  Article 15 of the CRC, therefore, means that children have the right to protest 
safely and that state obligations will involve specific consideration for one’s status as a child 
along with the safety issues that this consideration entails.  Children simultaneously need 
recognition of autonomy rights and protection of their vulnerabilities, and they arguably have 
rights under both the ICCPR and the CRC for authorities to take positive steps to vindicate 
their right to freedom of assembly.  
 
As noted above, the Committee on the Rights of the Child pointed to the obligation of Syria 
to ensure relevant authorities implement children’s protest rights, implying the need to 
educate such authorities on the matter.
241
  This certainly appears to fall within the 
responsibility to fulfil positive obligations to children.  Without adequate education and 
training there is far less chance that authorities such as police and security forces will be 
aware that children have protest rights, or that they are to be considered a vulnerable group.  
It will be particularly important to train authorities to consider older teenagers as part of this 
group.  Many individuals may not consider older teenagers to be ‘vulnerable’, although, as 
Castle
242
 demonstrated, they certainly can be vulnerable in the context of certain policing 
techniques.  Although there has not yet been a thorough examination of other international 
obligations specific to children’s rights relating to protest, many other relevant steps need to 
be taken to facilitate these rights.  Obligations to children are not being met if authorities fail 
to plan for the presence of children at demonstrations.  In demonstrations involving issues 
which affect children in particular, such as education cuts, authorities should plan for how to 
manage crowds which contain significant numbers of children.  Authorities should, for 
example, consider whether particular crowd control techniques which may be used, such as 
physically extreme techniques like the use of tear gas or ‘kettling’, could disproportionately 
affect children.  Where such training and planning is lacking, the vulnerable status of children 
can be overlooked and their protest rights can be harmed. 
 
VII. Regional Level: The Case Law of the European Convention of Human 
Rights 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, as the human rights monitoring body with the greatest 
body of jurisprudence, has the potential to progress or at least to provide insight into the 
rights of children to protest.  The Court appears to be the only regional mechanism that has 
provided judgments relevant to the matter of children’s rights in relation to protest, which is 
why its case law receives particular attention in this Article.  There have been a handful of 
petitions to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) which relate to protest, however none 
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of these directly invoke children’s rights.243  The European Court of Human Rights has heard 
a number of cases relating to protest under Article 11, the right to freedom of association and 
assembly,
244
 although only two cases
245
 have been considered which directly concern 
children’s rights and protest.   
 
In Valsamis v. Greece,
246
 the right to freedom of assembly and association was not directly 
invoked, yet the matter clearly related to the right to freedom of assembly (or perhaps more 
aptly, freedom from assembly).  A twelve-year-old girl (Victoria) and her parents claimed 
that Greece violated Articles 3, 9, 13 and A2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR
247
 when Victoria was 
suspended from school for a day for refusing to take part in a school parade celebrating the 
anniversary of war breaking out between Greece and Italy in 1940.
248
  The family were 
Jehovah’s witnesses and therefore pacifist, and they claimed that the apparently militaristic 
nature of the parade was against their religious convictions.
249
  The Court held that the parade 
was not sufficiently militaristic in nature, and therefore standing alone there were no breach 
of Articles 3, 9, and A2 of Protocol 1.  However, the Court did find a violation of Articles 9 
and A2 of Protocol 1 when taken together with Article 13 because of a lack of remedy at 
domestic level. 
 
It is crucial that the Court did not consider the child’s separate individual complaint250 and 
failed to address the question of whether the obligation was more offensive to Victoria than 
her parents. Although the Court dubiously held that the parade, which was memorializing a 
military event, held in front of military authorities, and placed on the same day as military 
parades, was not militaristic enough,
251
 the experience of the child seems nonetheless a 
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significant factor in considering whether there was a breach of the right to freedom of 
religion.  Victoria would have personally been in the midst of the parade, and she 
experienced first-hand the punishment for choosing not to go, yet her application was held 
not to merit separate consideration.  This omission is particularly difficult to justify 
considering that the Court did acknowledge that it was “surprised that pupils can be required 
on pain of suspension from school—even if only for a day—to parade outside the school 
precincts on a holiday.”252  The consequences of protest for Victoria were undoubtedly more 
immediate and stigmatizing than they were for her parents, and this is an unfortunate 
judgment from a children’s rights perspective.  At least in Valsamis the Court acknowledged 
the right to freedom of religion of Victoria as an individual, by deciding that the right had not 
been breached. 
 
Ten years after Valsamis, in Christian Democratic People's Party v. Moldova,
253
 when the 
issue of attendance of children at a gathering arose once again, the ECHR included a direct 
reference to the rights of children themselves in the judgment, albeit briefly and again 
primarily from the perspective of parents.  Furthermore, the case directly concerned inter alia 
the right of children to freedom of assembly and association.  The Court found that the 
Moldovan government had violated Article 11 of the ECHR when a one month ban was 
imposed on the oppositional Christian Democratic People's Party for holding public 
gatherings without permission in reaction to a proposed a law mandating the teaching of 
Russian in Moldovan schools.
254
  The court also rejected Moldova’s claims that the presence 
of children at the gatherings violated Article 15 of the CRC, since the rallies were primarily 
public and open to anyone to attend.
255
  The Court continued: 
 
Moreover, in the Court's view, it was rather a matter of personal choice for the parents 
to decide whether to allow their children to attend those gatherings and it would 
appear to be contrary to the parents’ and children’s freedom of assembly to prevent 
them from attending such events, which it must be recalled, were to protest against 
Government policy on schooling.
256
 
 
The Court appeared to focus its consideration primarily on the right of parents to permit 
children to attend or to take children to a gathering of this kind.  However, the explicit 
recognition of “children’s freedom of assembly” is a positive development, affirming 
children’s own stake in the right.  Also notable is that the Court seemed to imply that it is of 
additional significance that the gatherings were intended to protest matters directly relevant to 
children (i.e. education).  It is likely that this reference by the Court to children’s own rights 
in this context, as opposed to solely the rights of their parents, is due to the increasing 
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prominence of the participation rights of children, as espoused by Article 12 of the CRC and 
other articles of that Convention relating to autonomy rights.  
 
VIII. Domestic Level – England and Wales: The Case of Castle 
 
The case of Castle & Others v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis,
257
 in which 
children were amongst protestors kettled for long periods of time by police,
258
  provides a 
striking and contemporary example of the children’s rights issues which can arise in the 
context of mass demonstration where children’s special vulnerabilities are not sufficiently 
taken into account by authorities.  It also constitutes a disappointing judgment from a 
children’s rights perspective, as the obligations owed to children in the context of protest 
were interpreted very narrowly by the court.  
 
A.  Facts of the Castle Case 
 
In Castle, child-specific legislation was utilized in an unsuccessful attempt to argue that 
police had breached their duties towards children during a specific incidence of kettling.
259
  
The case arose in the jurisdiction of England and Wales, which has ratified the ECHR, the 
ICCPR, and the CRC.
260
  On November 24, 2010, the claimants, aged sixteen and fourteen, 
were confined in a cordon in central London for six and a half and five hours respectively 
during a protest march, despite requesting permission from police to leave.
261
  The march 
concerned proposals to increase university fees and to withdraw a financial scheme for 
students from low income families
262
 and was lead primarily by university students,
263
 though  
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there were many children present at the protest.
264
  The day was extremely cold—
temperatures were just above freezing—there was no provision of food or drink in the 
cordon, and toilet facilities were not provided for over four hours.
265
 
 
The claimants were not challenging the legality of containment but instead arguing that the 
defendants should have identified children as a group unlikely to be violent and should have 
had a plan in place to release them.
266
  The claimants alleged that their confinement breached 
the duties of the Police Commissioner under s.11 of the Children Act 2004, which states that 
the police have a duty to make “arrangements to safeguard and promote” the welfare of 
children.
267
  They also argued that the length of time for which they were confined was 
unlawful.
268
  These breaches, the claimants argued, constituted violations of Articles 5 (the 
right to liberty and security), 8 (the right to private and family life), 10 (the right to freedom 
of expression), and 11 (the right to freedom of assembly and association) of the ECHR.
269
  
The police argued that they had made attempts to identify vulnerable people inside the cordon 
during instances of unruliness and disorder, which were undeniably a challenge for police to 
manage.
270
   
 
The court held that although the Police Commissioner does have a duty to children in such 
circumstances under s.11 of the Children Act 2004,
271
 the defendant was not in breach of that 
duty during this event.
272
  It was reasonable for the defendant not to make specific 
arrangements for children save to remind police commanders “of the need to protect the 
vulnerable.”273  Furthermore, the specifics of the situation and violence outside the cordon 
justified the duration of the containment.
274
  The court further held that s.11 of the Children 
Act 2004 does indeed require planning where containment is expected or used in order to 
ensure that children are protected,
275
 but that in this case there was no indication there would 
be large numbers of children and therefore specific plans to manage the presence of children 
were not necessary.
276
  Because the Article 5 argument failed, the court  did not examine the 
other ECHR claims.
277
  
 
B.  Castle- Positive Obligations 
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It is important to place the facts of Castle, as well as issues regarding children and protest 
more generally, in the context of state obligations owed to children as enshrined by the 
international human rights framework which have been discussed in detail in this Article.  
 
The obligation to fulfil
278
 within Eide’s model is particularly relevant here because of 
children’s vulnerabilities.  The Castle case demonstrates these vulnerabilities and highlights 
the impact which authorities can have on children’s protest rights when they fail to 
implement positive obligations relating to the special status of children,
279
 a status 
acknowledged by the CRC,
280
 the ICCPR,
281
 and elsewhere.  The ECHR is perhaps the 
instrument of primary interest when considering positive obligations in the context of Castle, 
because the U.K. has incorporated ECHR rights into domestic law.
282
  Though the European 
Court of Human Rights has not had the opportunity to examine the particular duties to 
children as regards protest in particular, such duties have been emphasized in numerous other 
ECHR cases.  States have an obligation “particularly to children and other vulnerable 
members of society”283 to take steps to protect from ill-treatment, and special provision may 
have to be made in some contexts to account for children’s vulnerabilities.284  States also 
have positive obligations to facilitate protest under the ECHR.
285
  Although the Castle 
judgment acknowledged the duty to children in protest, determining the limits of that duty 
(i.e. that there was no violation of the duty as regards the incident in question) appears flawed 
when analyzed from the perspective of positive obligations to children under the ECHR, as 
well as the international instruments noted above. 
 
States may be required under the ECHR to take various steps to plan for demonstrations in 
order to preserve the right to freedom of assembly and of association.
286
  The obligation to 
fulfil would appear to require explicit consideration by authorities of the needs of children at 
a protest, as acknowledged by the court in Castle.
287
  The court’s conclusion that explicit 
planning was not needed in this instance
288
 appears difficult to justify considering the protest 
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related to an issue that affected school-age children most profoundly
289
 and the fact that there 
were indications of school walk-outs.
290
 So too does the court’s opinion that there had been 
no need to explicitly consider the specific needs of children in a situation of containment.
291
  
The court opined that plans to protect the vulnerable generally were sufficient,
292
 yet an 
examination of the procedures used by police highlights the inadequacy of failing to consider 
children as a particular group.  Police attempted to identify young people in school 
uniforms
293
 and “obvious small children”294 which would at best have located only some of 
the children present.  The claimants, for example, were not in uniform
295
 and were not 
“small” children, which undoubtedly lead to the denial of their request to leave the cordon. 
 
The decision of the individual officer not to permit the children to leave the cordon
296
 appears 
to point to deficiencies in the training of police on the matter of children and protest, an 
obligation which the Committee on the Rights of the Child has pointed to in its comments.
297
 
The police argued in Castle that they had met their training obligations because in general 
police training there are materials on identifying children’s needs as per the statutory 
guidance to the relevant legislation,
298
 and in police training on public order events reference 
is made to allowing vulnerable people to exit police containment.
299
  Police training on public 
order events was acknowledged, however, not to make reference to children specifically and 
the court noted that it should.
300
  The court did not comment on whether the failure to include 
reference to children in police training was relevant to whether police were adequately 
prepared for containment on the occasion in question.  This seems unfortunate as the 
significance appears to be self-evident.  Instructions on how and when to quickly release 
children from containment could be given in both tactical preparation and training.  An 
obvious suggestion would be that police training should include instructions that persons who 
can produce documentation proving that they are under eighteen should be released when 
they so request.  This presumption could be rebutted where there was reason to believe an 
individual would be violent, or would be in danger in the area into which they would be 
released.  The special position of children could justify this, bearing in mind the duty to those 
under eighteen.
301
  The Castle children were accompanied by their father—a journalist with a 
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press pass
302—a strong indication that these young people were not going to engage in 
violence and that they should have been released.   
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasized in its comments the state 
obligation to ensure that legislation is in conformity with Article 15 of the CRC.
303
  The 
Castle case appears to highlight the inadequacy of the legislative guidance on the duty to 
protect children’s autonomy rights generally and their protest rights in particular.  The 
guidance is focused almost exclusively on protection rights for children in the narrow context 
of the family.
304
  Reference was made by the court in Castle to the fact that the statutory 
guidance specifies that the primary role of the police’s duty to children will be in areas of, for 
example, protecting children in the context of domestic violence and child abuse cases.
305
 
The duty to account for the welfare of a child decreases outside the area of family life.
306
  The 
guidance fails to acknowledge the right of children to partake in public life, an omission 
which seems detrimental to their right to protest.  More explicit reference in the guidance to 
the duty to children in a public context may have persuaded the court to permit the duty to 
children in this case to weigh more strongly against the general duty of the police to maintain 
law and order.  
 
C.  Conclusions on the Castle Case 
 
States are obliged to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of children to engage in protest, 
and positive obligations are particularly relevant for children compared to other groups.  In 
general at international level, states have “a wide discretion in the choice of the means to be 
used”307 when taking positive measures to facilitate protest.  However, the safety and well-
being of children is arguably of such importance that a state’s discretion should decrease 
when it comes to the use of tactics which are particularly harmful to children.  Although this 
specific matter has yet to be examined at international level, the argument can be made that, 
considering the vital nature of protest rights and the special status of children, states have a 
variety of obligations in this context.  In particular, states have a positive obligation which 
involves ensuring that legislation protects or is interpreted as protecting children’s right to 
protest, and that simultaneously children’s rights are specifically considered at both the 
planning and execution stages when protests are policed.  
 
When considered in light of these obligations, the authorities appear to have failed to 
adequately vindicate children’s rights for the November 24, 2010 London march, and the 
High Court of England and Wales also failed to uphold those rights. That the Court 
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recognized that the statutory duty to children applied in the context of protest was 
undoubtedly an achievement for children’s rights. Arguably, however, the Court did not give 
sufficient attention to the ECHR obligation to children because of their vulnerabilities, 
focusing instead on the narrowly-drafted domestic statutory guidance, and deferring to the 
police decision not to explicitly consider children’s needs in advance of this particular 
protest.  The Court surprisingly made no reference to other international obligations, such as 
those under the CRC.  Although the CRC has not been incorporated into the domestic law of 
England and Wales, it has been used as a persuasive source of guidance in numerous U.K. 
cases concerning children, particularly those relating to children’s autonomy rights.308  The 
failure to consider it in this case seems very questionable.  The Court did not take an 
approach to the matter in Castle which placed great emphasis on children’s rights, refraining, 
for example, from taking the opportunity to examine the issue from the perspective of Article 
11 of the ECHR.  The approach of the court constitutes a failure in a liberal democratic state 
to adequately vindicate children’s protest rights. 
 
IX. Conclusions 
 
There must be greater regard for the increasing involvement of children in protests.  Children 
possess the same right to protest as adults under a number of different international human 
rights law instruments, and many children are willing and able to exercise that right.  The 
issues about which recent protests have been held—education cuts, unemployment, 
inequality—are those issues which directly affect children.  The technology now available to 
children has engaged them in protest and made for more widespread and effective 
movements.  Yet, the approach of authoritarian regimes toward children in protest has proven 
highly dangerous for children’s safety, sometimes resulting in torture or death for children.  
In democratic states increasingly repressive policing has also lead to hazards for children, 
such as through kettling.  Law generally, and international human rights law in particular, 
should be used to achieve greater facilitation of children in effectively enjoying the right to 
protest.  
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has paid some attention to the increasing 
connection between children and the right to protest and has on occasion provided insightful 
guidance on the implementation of protest rights.  In addition to emphasizing the obligations 
on states to ensure that legislation is in conformity with that instrument,
309
 to facilitate 
protest, and to protect the safety of children in this context,
310
 the Committee has also 
appeared to establish obligations to educate officials on children’s protest rights, 311  to 
encourage children to form associations,
312
 and to refrain from requiring children to seek 
parental consent to join associations.
313
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Nevertheless, the nature of the reporting process has not lent itself to in-depth consideration 
of the matter.  The comments of the Committee on the Rights of the Child do not provide a 
thorough analysis and have sometimes failed to focus on children and protest, when arguably 
such a focus was needed.
314
  The Committee has not, for example, highlighted the particular 
vulnerabilities of children, nor has it elucidated in any detail the positive obligations which 
arise from this vulnerability.  This means that there is no detailed guidance at the domestic 
level regarding children and protest, although one can deduce that obligations exist such as 
planning for the presence of children at demonstrations and training officers on the specifics 
of these events. 
 
General human rights monitoring mechanisms have likewise failed to provide substantial 
guidance.  Although the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed in Christian 
Democratic People's Party v. Moldova
315
 that the right to freedom of assembly and 
association applies to children, it has not considered in detail the matter of the rights of 
children to protest.  None of the other international or regional mechanisms have considered 
the matter of children and protest.  There is substantial scope for UN mechanisms to provide 
increased guidance in the area.  The Universal Periodic Review process, for example, has 
accorded a significant amount of attention to children’s rights issues, yet the process has 
rarely focused on children’s freedom rights.316  Instead, it has focused on more traditional 
matters such as education and violence against children.
317
  Both non-governmental 
organizations and states could be encouraged to engage more with freedom rights generally, 
and rights relating to protest in particular, through this process. 
 
There is little evidence that domestic legislation or judgments are advancing children’s 
protest rights.  In the questionable Castle judgment, the police were held not to have failed in 
their duties towards children.  Yet, officers refused permission to those clearly identifiable as 
children to leave the cordon for up to seven hours, leaving them cold, hungry and for the 
most part without toilets, and ultimately released many of them alone into central London late 
on a Winter evening.
318
  While this was a distressing scenario for the adults who were 
cordoned, the particular consequences for children are clear.  The authorities accepted in this 
case that special obligations are owed to children,
319
 however, that threshold was set very low 
indeed.  It was not necessary for the police authorities to consider explicitly the needs of 
children in a protest regarding education, which large numbers of children were likely to 
attend and in which kettling would possibly be used.
320
  The standard set in Castle arguably 
does not appear consistent with ECHR case law on the positive duty to protect children.   The 
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standard set also appears out of line with the ICCPR, which places positive duties on states to 
facilitate protest.
321
  The judgment is also not in conformity with the CRC, which explicitly 
enshrines the principle of the best interests of the child together with the right of children to 
freedom of assembly and association.
322
  Perhaps if the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
provided more explicit guidance on the matter, the court in Castle would have been more 
inclined to uphold stronger standards for children’s protest rights. 
 
The right of children to participate in matters affecting them has become increasingly 
recognized, and it needs to be acknowledged that children have as much to contribute to 
protest movements as adults.  It will not be possible to facilitate the right of children to 
peaceful protest unless their special vulnerabilities are adequately acknowledged.  The 
conceptualization of positive obligations in the international human rights framework lends 
itself to an interpretation of the implementation of children’s protest rights as requiring 
recognition of both children’s abilities and vulnerabilities.  Yet, because of the lack of 
attention to the area at international level to date, clear affirmation of this is lacking.  As the 
Castle case demonstrates, domestic standards need to exist that require a special duty to 
children through adequate planning for their needs in protest.  From a children’s rights 
perspective, however, this planning should be particular to children as a group.  Authorities 
should be required to consistently consider the needs of children in this regard, or the 
traditional exclusion of children from public life generally and politics in particular
323
 will 
persist. 
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